On February 1, Professors Andrew Knapp and Jennifer Koh spoke at a symposium organized by the Southwestern Law Review on “Immigration in the Trump Era.” Both participated in a panel entitled, “Dimaya and the Crimmigration of Migration.” Professor Knapp shared about his representation of James Dimaya, whose case he took from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, and for whom he and the rest of the legal team prevailed in Sessions v. Dimaya (invalidating a portion of the “crime of violence” definition in immigration law under the void for vagueness doctrine). Professor Koh’s comments focused on the void for vagueness doctrine and immigration enforcement, which arose from her law review article, “Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine,” which appeared in a 2017 issue of the Wisconsin Law Review as well as a forthcoming essay that will soon appear in the Stanford Law Review Online.
Professor Jennifer Koh recently published Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness in the Wisconsin Law Review. The article discusses the application of the void for vagueness doctrine to crime-based removal provisions in the immigration law. It argues that the federal courts should find several immigration provisions unconstitutionally vague because the twin values animating vagueness doctrine–providing reasonable notice and preventing arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement practices–apply with exceptional force in immigration, an area of law in which the liberty stakes of the crime-based removal grounds are high, notice is critical, and the risk of arbitrariness and discrimination by government actors at multiple levels is acute. The article was cited in the merits brief of the Respondent as well as the amicus brief submitted by the National Immigration Project to the United States Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya, a case involving whether 18 U.S.C. sec. 16(b), as incorporated into the federal immigration law, is unconstitutionally vague. The citation for the article is 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 1127.